Socratic Method.
The relation between virtue and knowledge is one of the main Socratic concerns, which, in further development, leads to a view of human excellence. Socrates traces the argument for the supremacy of virtue and the power of knowledge throughout his dialogues and reveals the truth at the core of seemingly strange claims that he often makes. It appears to be that Socrates was more aware of the complex causes of human action and of the power of irrational passions than it might seem at first (and to his opponents). Perhaps, that is why his concern with this question is so strong and it lives through a lot of his dialogues. The question of virtue and its singularity (that he proves) is also important in understanding human ignorance, as it shown later in The Protagoras. Virtue is not knowledge in any ordinary sense, but true virtue is nothing other than wisdom.
Socrates forms his view of wisdom through three dialogues: Protagoras, Charmides and Latches. The Laches provides search for the meaning of virtue of courage. Throughout the dialogue, two generals, Nicias and Laches attempt to define the nature of courage, while Socrates give them his responds. Socrates calls it “this thing of virtue”; but specifically, they are discussing only a part of virtue, which is courage. Further in dialogue, Nicias extends his definition of courage to include knowledge of all good and evil things, past, present and future. Here, Socrates makes a crucial point: man who had knowledge of all good and bad things at any time would embody all virtue and not merely a part of it. Since courage is in fact only a part of virtue, there must be a contradiction, so the definition must be false. By the end of the dialogue Socrates has defeated each of the arguments and proven to his opponents Nicias and Laches that they don’t know what the nature of courage is. In the end, Socrates proposes that the whole company should go back to school again and that he will also do so himself. However, this failure is itself a strong point of the dialogue. No participants provide an adequate definition (explanation) of courage, ironically, as famous worriers they thought they knew so well.
Temperance becomes a central matter of discussion to the Charmides in the question of self-knowledge; the dialogue tests σωφροσύνη (sophrosyne), depending on questions such what it might mean to know one's own knowledge, including knowing what one does not know. As the hypothetical definition of temperance that dominates most of the dialogue's debate, self-knowledge expands into a quality that is both more precise and less graspable than mere self-awareness. As defined in the Charmides, it is a knowledge of ‘itself’ (wisdom) and involves knowing what one knows and what one does not know (a kind of knowledge whose "subject matter" is contemporarily knowledge itself ("what one knows") and the absence of knowledge ("what one does not know"). Further, it leads to a lot of controversy and questions such as: is it possible to know what one doesn’t know? Is there a matter of pure self-knowledge at all? Is self-knowledge being a key for being temperate? Is there a link between knowledge and happiness?
Now I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us in our work. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear Critias—this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine [173c-d].
Later, Socrates admits that knowledge of any kind will not necessarily lead to happiness. Even though long examination, this question is never really resolved in the dialogue.
In the first part of Protagoras the main argument arises between the elderly famous sophist Protagoras and Socrates. The discussion concerns the nature of sophists, the unity and the matter of virtue as a teachable one. Protagoras claims that he educates his students in politics and in how to manage household, arguing that virtue is teachable due to fact that everyone possess virtue by telling the myth of the Prometheus. When discussing the poem by Simonides, Socrates interprets that poem narrates that it is hard to become good, but it is impossible to be good at all times, guided by misfortunes (such as ignorance). He further argues that the only evil is a lack of knowledge, because no one would act in such a way, knowing what is good. Cowardice (as well as courage) is a form of knowledge, the opposite of knowing what is really worth to fear. Protagoras accepts Socratic idea of virtue (wisdom, temperance, justice and holiness all name the same thing, later adding courage to the list). Socrates accepts Protagoras’ idea that virtue is knowledge. Learning how to be virtuous, perhaps, means learning a specific type of knowledge or science. But this means that we need to understand properly what knowledge is. Further, Socrates shifts the subject of discussion to focus more precisely on what virtue exactly is and weather it has different parts or it is united category.
In the Protagoras (329b-333b) Socrates argues for the view that all of the virtues—justice, wisdom, courage, piety, and temperance—are one. Socrates rejects a popular opinion that it is possible to be wise without being temperate. He insists, that possibility of singularity grounds on the fact that wisdom and temperance both have the same opposite: folly. If they would be different virtues, each would have their own opposites. The argument of the opposites concludes that wisdom is impossible to grasp on without temperance (and vice versa):
“The proposition that for one thing there is only one opposite, or there one stating that wisdom is different from temperance and that each is a part of virtue, and that in addition to being distinct they are dissimilar, both in themselves and in their power or functions, just like parts of a face?” [333b].
Perhaps, virtue is a form of knowledge, in Socratic view. Qualities such as health, strength, beauty, and etc. benefit humans, but also can harm if accompanied by ignorance. Qualities of the soul remain neutral unless accomplished by wisdom or folly, therefore, wisdom must be some kind of knowledge:
“… we are agreeing that nothing was stronger or better than knowledge, which always prevails, whenever it is present, over pleasure and everything else … this is what “being overcome by pleasure” is – ignorance in the highest degree…” [357 c-e].
Establishing that virtue is knowledge, Protagoras and Socrates make a conclusion that evil is merely another name for ignorance. If virtue is knowledge, then education is, in a very real sense, the creation of virtuous souls. Perhaps, this points to a conception of knowledge as a process, not as something that can be abstracted from life and written down once and for all. Thus, both Protagoras and Socrates end up arguing the opposite of their positions at the beginning of the text, and the dialogue ends.
According to Plato’s writings, Socrates began to engage in such discussions with his fellow Athenians after his friend from youth, Chaerephon, visited the Oracle of Delphi, which confirmed that no man in Greece was wiser than Socrates. Socrates saw this as a paradox and began widely practicing Socratic method to answer his conundrum.
When Socrates applies his philosophical method in a dialogue he often debates with people who ether known as wise (Protagoras) or known as masters of a particular subject (Nicias and Laches). In a dialogue, it often turns out to be that truth isn’t clear for opponents or knowledge isn’t given in its pure form, so it creates a problem and assumes its investigation. During this conversation, subject explains he believes answering Socrates’ questions, which, in turn, reveals whether he is knowledgeable or ignorant of the conversation matter.
It is a dialectical method of hypothesis elimination, where initiation of one of the speakers (usually Socrates, sometimes all) directed at:
Eliminating contradictions.
Eliminate self-assurance of the other speaker, who really is ignorant (Socratic Irony).
Orienting himself, speaker and sometimes an audience toward knowledge.
Finding elements that were hidden prior to the conversation.
Seeking to characterize general characteristics shared by the various particular instance of the conversation matter.
Socratic irony is a form of communication employed by Socrates to reveal the ignorance of his interlocutors while insincerely praising their abilities and where Socrates initially admires own ignorance of the matter. Philosopher belied that the only thing that can be known by a person is that he or she knows nothing. Which means, if you know that you know nothing, then the one is slightly wiser than anybody else who believes that they know something. Within this context, Socrates's behavior seems more appropriate: by convincing other characters that they do not actually know the nature of something they thought they did, Socrates brings these people closer to one single truth and grain of knowledge—namely, that they know nothing. The one who’s aware that she/he knows nothing about a subject wouldn't wish to begin a conversation about it for obvious reasons.
ἔλεγχος, or cross-examination, is another Socratic technique that consists of an intensive series of questions that aims to explore the essence and nature of virtue or defining moral aspects that were covered in conversation. Platonic dialogues that actually involve a significant amount of dialogue generally take the form of the elenchus. The elenchus is both a form of debate and a form of inquiry: by proposing and refuting hypotheses, two people proceed, primarily through negations, toward a positive knowledge or at least toward an understanding that they do not know what they thought they knew.
Temperance as self-knowledge (the primary focus of the dialogue) must involve knowing what one does not know; elenchus (the form of the dialogue) is a process of proceeding toward knowledge through refutation, through a process of realizing what one does not know. In the end, the elenchus as the philosophical process is one of the few things we feel we might be able to salvage from the "failure" of Socrates's and Critias's debate.
In Laches elenchus working its way toward defining virtue of courage. In the beginning, Socrates questions what the initial purpose of the training is meant to instill in the children. Once they determine that the purpose is to instill virtue, and more specifically courage, Socrates discusses with Laches and Nicias what exactly courage is. The bulk of the dialogue is then the three men (Laches, Nicias, and Socrates) debating various definitions of courage.
The conversation starts with the question of youth education and value of military training. After debate, weather generals qualified to answer a question about education or not, they cooperate with Socrates and test their expertise. Socrates uses an analogy to define goodness. If sight can be improved by adding vision to it, a character can improve by adding goodness, therefore, it is necessary to have a conception of good before properly applying it:
“… but let us first see if we have a sufficient knowledge of a part. Then it’s likely that the investigation will be easier for us,” proposes Socrates [190d].
Socrates then shifts the conversation to focus on the nature of the thing that they are broadly attempting to discuss. Most generally, Socrates calls it this thing of virtue; but specifically, they are discussing only a part of virtue, which is courage. Laches defines a man of courage as one who does not run away from an enemy. Socrates explains that this definition does not cover all the cases of courage so that Laches must come up with a more general definition. Laches then defines courage as "an endurance of the soul" [192c]. Socrates continues to press Laches to narrow his definition to a "wise endurance of the soul" [192d] and then proves to him that courage is actually closer to a foolish endurance of the soul [193b].
Next, Nicias defines courage as a kind of wisdom, or as "knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and every other situation" [195a]. Laches criticizes Nicias, claiming that such a definition includes non-courageous men as well as courageous. Socrates argues that Nicias’s definition doesn’t consider courageous animals such as the boar or the lion who have no knowledge. Nicias defends his definition against Socrates and drawing distinction between courage, which is a form of wisdom, and fearlessness, which animals possess.
Finally, Socrates attacks Nicias's position by claiming that his definition that courage is knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope only deals with the future of courage and neglects the present and past. Nicias extends his definition to include not only the knowledge of hope and fear but also includes knowledge of all good and evil things in past, present, and future. However, at this point, Socrates notes that a man who had knowledge of all good and bad things at any time would embody not merely a part of virtue, but all. Refuted, Nicias abandons his definition and not one makes any other attempt to define courage. Despite the fact that no one else, including Socrates, can explain the nature of courage, he is proposed to become a teacher for the children of Lysimachus and Melesias. At the end, Socrates suggests that all men should go to school in order to learn the nature of courage.
The Socratic method, practice of which appeared in Laches and Charmides was practiced in many other dialogues. The success of the method often depended upon resolution and the fact weather opponents learned something or not (even if they only ensured their ignorance). In both cases, where learning appeared, the Socratic method can be considered successful, because it achieves one or more of its aims.
