Either/Or
Either/Or is a real adventure, with all tautologies, endless equivocates and conventions, not every reader can easily survive in. Here are introduced dialectic stages of human existence, aesthetically, ethically and religiously. With exceptional art Kierkegaard describes different life stances, therewith changing writing styles, nevertheless showing that Christian way of life can be approached moving consistently trough aesthetic and ethical to religious.
Either/Or portrays two life views, one consciously hedonistic, the other based on ethical duty and responsibility. The aesthete, according to Kierkegaard's model, will eventually find himself in "despair", a psychological state that results from recognition of the limits of the aesthetic approach to life. Here, I will make an attempt to describe ethical and aesthetic views of Ether/Or and figure out what B tries to accomplish in the letter.
In the letter “The Balance Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality” B, Judge William, starts with confession regarding his youth: “I listened with childish trust to the talk of my elders, and at the moment of choice become a very solemn and momentous matter, although in choosing I only followed someone else’s directions (E/O II, p.157),” to highlight importance of choice. When one makes choice, claims B, “every time truth, justice and sanctity appear on one side and lust and natural inclinations, dark passions and perdition on the other side (E/O II, p.157).” This controversy is serving to highlight the contrasts between aesthetic and ethical, which are, according to B, always are two sides of the choice.
B accuses A in habitual usage of Either/Or and disregard to its meaning: “On you they work like a strong drink on a high-strung person; you become completely intoxicated in what you call the higher mindness (E/O II, p. 158).” Thus, A disregards choice not on a daily biases, as it is too simple for him, but the higher order choice, the life choice. A is lacking seriousness, when choice concerns ethical or aesthetic choice; B accuses A into being a masquerader, when his mask falls, interest disappears, really A’s empty: “You yourself are non-entity, an enigmatic figure on whose brow stands Either/Or (E/O II, p.159).” B ensures, sneaking away from the choice is meaningless, the choice will approach in spite one’s will. B explains that he knew people who tried it and failed; deceiving others and playing hide-and-seek erased ability to show true nature or force their secret thoughts on others loathsomely. Either way the end is fated: “You really should not be facetious about something that is not only earnest but is also dreadful (E/O II, p. 160),” warns B.
Unhappiest of all is a person who can scarily open himself and therefore, cannot love, hinder own transparency and so inexplicably intertwined in the life-relations that lie beyond. B sees that A playing a dangerous game, playing close to the edge. B appeals to A to stop wild flight, the passion for annihilation that rages within, to save the damned soul of A.
To approach A, B comes up with imaginative situation, where young man, “at the age when life really begins to have some meaning for him (E/O II, p.161)”, rich in hope of everyone who knows him made a mistake, very trustful to A. B asking A to imagine what would he do, if such a young man would seek an enlightenment about enigmas of life; would A simply say Either/Or or brush away? B sure that A, as someone who values brilliant young man too much due to beauty of youth itself, would not tempt his sense of irony here, he would feel that it is not unimportant how one uses own youth, that one is faced with a choice, an actual Either/Or and maturing personality. A will straighten young man’s soul, vindicate him in confidence, assure that there is a power in a human being that can defy the whole world and urge him very strongly to use his time. This, will make A to admit the importance of an Either/Or, because A’s soul was moved by love for the young man, as he explains it. However, soon his soul will be touched by doubt, and then he will see “a sad consequence of person’s inability to disclose his nature harmoniously (E/O II, p. 162).” Shortly A will recognize same pattern in a young man’s soul and feel sorry; unable to grieve for himself, A is actually proud of his “dubious wisdom” and can’t let another to share it, since A wants it all. Also, A will somehow find regrettable that the young man arrived at the same wisdom. B is terrified by A’s contradiction and suggests that only by means of Either/Or A can extricate himself from it. B is sure, A is young enough to make a choice and find himself -- the main concern in life.
Choice is crucial content of the personality; it submerges itself in that which is being chosen, “and when it does not choose, it withers away in atrophy (E/O II, p.163).” In the abstract sense, choice is always has “the deepest relation” to one who is choosing. The choice is always hardened by alternatives, than longer one postpones it, than harder it is to choose, due to constant “pondering”. Often this leads to refrain of Either/Or, “because others have chosen for him – or because he has lost himself (E/O II, p. 164).” B writes that if he himself recognized the importance of choice, A is preventing the choice and here is why it dangerous: “If one believes that at some moment a person can keep his personality completely blank and bare or that in the strictest sense one can halt and discontinue personal life, one certainly is mistaken (E/O II, p.164).” B says when one is choosing; one’s personality is already interested in choice, when one puts off the choice, the personality or obscure forces within unconsciously chose. To choose timely is important; otherwise, it’s harder and harder to eliminate the wrong choice.
A’s choice is aesthetic, and aesthetic choice isn’t a choice according to B. For him the only real choice is ethical, because the real absolute choice is always between good and evil, not a grey area, abidance or immediacy as aesthetic choice that is difficult and easy at the same time: having narrower ranged, but more meaningful choice. Ethical choice presupposes transfiguration, with all weirdness of personality, and is what aesthetic choice missing. B trying to awake A, calling to earnestness of spirit: “and yet you will miss out on the highest, on the only thing that truly gives life meaning; you may win the whole world and lose yourself (E/O II, p.168).” Therefore, choice is converged to ethical or aesthetic way of living. Aesthetic isn’t evil for B, it’s merely nothingness, hence, doesn’t allow choice at all. Ethical allows the choice of willing, in turn possessing choice of good or evil. Baptism of the will is purely ethical; it simplifies one’s decision-making that has meaning. For B Ether/Or is purely ethical, the reality of choice itself, and this what A has to be awaken to, that is the last step where B is able to help him. As soon ethical choice is made, one becomes true oneself: “Then the soul has seen the highest, which no mortal eye can see and which can never be forgotten; then the personality receives the accolade of knighthood that ennobles it for eternity (E/O II, p. 177).” Everyone is keepable of ethical choice, if one only wishes to do so. In a sense, Either/Or is absolute, “for it is between choosing and not choosing (E/O II, p.177).”
The Judge goes on to claim that A’s devotion to the aesthetic prevents A from making any significant choices. Although A has a far wider range of options than the Judge, the Judge argues that since the Judge’s choices are limited by ethics—by a consideration of other people—his choices are much weightier and mean much more to him than A’s aesthetic choices mean to A. The aesthetic has its place, the Judge agrees, but the place of the ethical is superior to the aesthetic.
The Judge, in making the case for the ethical life, continually comes back to the point that the ethical life leads to even more aesthetic enjoyment than the purely aesthetic life. However, the Judge’s arguments don’t actually prove that the ethical life is wholly separate and better than the aesthetic life, trying to convince A of the value of the ethical stage of life by arguing that the ethical person can still enjoy aesthetic values. The difference is that the pursuit of pleasure is tempered with ethical values and responsibilities.
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that studies how man ought to act given the nature of reality and how man knows it. Aesthetics is the selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s judgment. In art, the artist's view of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics will be concertizes. The values of the artist will be present in his paintings, music or sculpture. Aesthetic strongly collides with interpretation, that allows some plasticity. The problem is that ethical judgement can be made trough aesthetic prism, but it’s a big step from aesthetic, due aesthetic variety. I assume that it is purely two different ways to choose, but disagree with B that aesthetic choice is nothingness. Today we can see a lot of examples of morality in aesthetics, for example Banksy. Famous graffitist is calling to collective morality trough the aesthetic work. I’m not very sure what B would respond to example that stands on the edge of Either and Or, but we clearly can argue that aesthetic choice can imply ethical beginning.
Honesty, loyalty and kindness are ethical virtues, as much as unity, harmony and delicacy are aesthetic ones, but aren’t there things that contain virtues of both? If there wouldn’t, our lives would be greatly simplified. Here, I would argue, Kierkegaard takes the unusual step of having each stage of life described and represented by exaggerated characters, probably for the sake of demonstrativeness.
“What I have said to you so often I say once more, or rather I shout it to you: Either/Or!” says B. We come across views of life, which teach that one must enjoy life but place the condition for doing so outside the individual. This is the case with every life-view that relies upon wealth, glory, nobility, etc. We meet views of life, which teach that one must enjoy life, but the condition for doing so lies in the individual. But both life-views agree that one must enjoy life.
Even if B concede allowance of aesthetic in ethical life, still one can only choose oneself in respect of one's freedom when one chooses oneself ethically; but one can only choose oneself ethically by repenting oneself, and it is only by repenting oneself that one becomes concrete, and it is only as a concrete individual that one is a free individual. This gives the ethical individual a sense of security, which someone living merely aesthetically altogether lacks. The person who lives aesthetically sees only possibilities everywhere; for him it is these that form the content of the future, whereas the person who lives ethically sees tasks everywhere. I believe that B sees A as aggressively selfish, but acknowledges that there is a place for a balanced aesthetic—balanced, that is, by ethics; otherwise, his theory is merely finality. The judge believes that the aesthetic has its place, but as the servant of the ethical. Further it would seem that Kierkegaard thought that both the aesthetic and the ethical had their place as servants of the religious.
